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INTRODUCTION
America is hard at work. While American employees traditionally
have exhibited a strong work ethic, the past few decades have ushered in
a remarkable increase in the overall amount of work effort in the United
States. Two parallel forces have led this surge. First, many individuals-primarily women-who were full-time caregivers in the past, now
t Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law
School. The author thanks Jessica Clay for her excellent assistance on the preparation of this
article as well as Anne T. Johnson for her editorial assistance. The author also thanks Katherine Wild, Megan Valentine, and the other officers and staff of the Cornell Journal of Law and
Public Policy for organizing such a fine symposium.
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divide their time between family care and market work. ' Second, this
larger cadre of workers is putting in significantly more time at work per
person. The average full-time American employee now works approximately 160 more hours each year than he or she worked 30 years ago.2
Many scholars have written about the work/family phenomenon. 3
Professor Rachel Amow-Richman has joined this dialogue with her contribution to this symposium. She examines the possibility of using an
accommodation model of workplace regulation as a vehicle for easing
the work/family tug of war. 4 She chronicles how accommodation requirements embodied in existing employment statutes, notably the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 5 and the Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA), 6 have failed to live up to their intended promise. 7 She
concludes, accordingly, that a direct mandate of caregiver paid leave
would better serve to ease the problem of competing work and family
demands than would an accommodation based alternative. 8
I agree with most of Professor Arnow-Richman's analysis but find
two points of departure. While I agree that some courts have construed
the substance of the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement narrowly, I believe that, as a matter of procedure, the ADA's interactive
process has created a laudable revolution in how disability-related issues
are addressed at work. In addition, the current worker time crunch goes
beyond the countervailing tensions posed by the work/family divide.
While caregivers face particularly acute problems, American workers of
all stripes are increasingly compelled to spend more time at work. Given
this broader problem, a broader solution also is in order.
Part I of this article briefly summarizes Professor Arnow-Richman's
analysis and conclusions. Part II describes the competing pressures of
I See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
2

See

LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA

2002/2003 117

tbl.2.1 (2003).
3 See, e.g., Phyllis T. Bookspan, A Delicate Imbalance-Family and Work, 5 TEX. J.

WOMEN & L. 37 (1995); Lisa Bornstein, Inclusions and Exclusions in Work-Family Policy:
The Public Values and Moral Code Embedded in the Family and Medical Leave Act, 10
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 77 (2000); ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN
WORK BECOMES HOME AND HOME BECOMES WORK (1997); JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE (1991); Vicki Schultz, Essay,
Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1881 (2000); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY
FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT (2000).

4 Professor Arnow-Richman has also previously written on the subject. See Rachel
Arnow-Richman,Accommodation Subverted: The Future of WorklFamily Initiatives in a "Me,
Inc. " World, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 345 (2003).
5 Equal Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities (Americans with Disabilities Act),

42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (2000).
6 Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2654 (2000).
7 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 4, at 362-73.

8 See id. at 402-09.
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work and family, as well as the FMLA's current family care leave provision. Part III examines both the negative and positive attributes of the
accommodation approach to workplace regulation in light of the experience provided under the ADA. Part IV then turns to the broader worker
time crunch problem and proposes a statutory provision for paid leave
that could be used for caregiving as well as for other purposes.
I.

ACCOMMODATION SUBVERTED

Professor Arnow-Richman's article examines the feasibility of
adopting an accommodation framework as a means of alleviating the
work/family time crunch. 9 Commentators have increasingly championed
the accommodation device for this role. I0 While the ADA contains the
most notable accommodation requirement," Professor Arnow-Richman
defines the notion of accommodation more broadly to encompass "affirmative behavior by employers designed to allow women the opportunity to participate fully in market work."' 12 An accommodation, as such,
goes beyond the negative anti-discrimination prohibition of some employment statutes 13 to compel employers to take "active steps" to pro14
mote functional equality.
Professor Arnow-Richman's stated purpose in writing this article is
to "expose[ ] the limitations of mandated accommodation as a unitary
strategy for redressing workplace disadvantage attributable to care-giving."' 15 She finds that an accommodation framework is unlikely to serve
this purpose adequately for two reasons. First, she points to decisions
construing the ADA and the FMLA in which courts demonstrate a reluctance to interpret the accommodation mandate beyond formal equality
principles. 16 She opines that while accommodations are a potentially
powerful tool for reformulating workplace relationships, the ADA and
the FMLA have not effectuated wide-scale changes in work structures or
9 See generally Arnow-Richman, supra note 4.
10 See, e.g., Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine ParentalObligations in an Era of

Work-Family Conflict: Lessons from Religious Accommodations, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 1443
(2001).
11 See infra Part III.A and accompanying text.
12 Amow-Richman, supra note 4, at 347 (footnote omitted).
13 Title VII, for example, prohibits employers from discriminating "because of [an] individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) uses similar language in banning discrimination because of age. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000) ("It shall be unlawful for an employer
to ...

discriminate against any individual ...

14 Arnow-Richman, supra note 4, at 348.
15 Id. at 349.
16 Id. at 363-73.

because of such individual's age.").
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norms. 17 She concludes that a caregiver accommodation mandate would
8
likely receive a similar limiting construction.'
Professor Arnow-Richman believes that employer attitudes present
a second obstacle to the potential success of a caregiver accommodation
requirement. In the past few decades, the competitive pressures of the
global economy have led employers to abandon internal labor markets
for more short-term employment relationships. 19 In these more contingent arrangements, employers seek to maximize productivity while minimizing obligations to employees. 2 0 In this climate, employers have an
economic incentive to make accommodation requirements politically un21
feasible and practically unworkable.
Because of these impediments to a potential accommodation solution, Professor Arnow-Richman suggests an alternative in the form of a
government-facilitated wage replacement program. She proposes the
adoption of an insurance-based federal caregiver replacement program
financed with contributions from both employers and employees.2 2 She
suggests such a program should incorporate incentives for employers to
23
adopt innovative approaches to voluntary caregiver accommodations.
She also maintains that labor law reform is necessary in order to revitalize collective action as a means of facilitating work/family benefits on
24
the ground floor of the employment relationship.
I agree with most of Professor Arnow-Richman's analysis. The
time pressures faced by working caregivers, particularly female
caregivers, often deter successful participation in market work.2 5 The
FMLA's unpaid leave accommodation provides an inadequate remedy to
this work attachment gap problem that disproportionately afflicts female
workers. 26 Professor Arnow-Richman correctly posits that the courts
have undercut the potential of the ADA's reasonable accommodation device through a crimped equal treatment vision of anti-discrimination
law. 27 As a result, I also agree that an accommodation approach is not
the best potential vehicle for closing the female worker attachment gap.
Finally, as I have written elsewhere, I share Professor Arnow-Richman's
17 Id. at 363, 373.
18 See id. at 373.
19 See Amow-Richman, supra note 4, at 380-86; Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and CriticalAssessment, 43 B.C. L. REV.
351, 366-69 (2002).
20 See Amow-Richman, supra note 4, at 383-86; Befort, supra note 19, at 368-69.
21 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 4, at 383-86.
22 Id. at 403-09.
23 Id. at 407-09.
24

Id. at 409-16.

25 See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
27 See infra Part III.B.
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belief that labor law reform is sorely needed in order to rebalance the
28
playing field of labor-management relations in the United States.
However, my analysis diverges from that of Professor Arnow-Richman in two respects. First, while many courts have narrowly construed
the substantive provisions of the ADA, I believe that the statute nonetheless has produced a revolutionary change in workplace procedural norms
by compelling an interactive dialogue between employees and employers
for the purpose of identifying potentially appropriate accommodations
that enable disabled employees to participate in the workforce. 29 Second, while the caregiver time problem is particularly troublesome, American workers today generally experience a more pervasive time crunch
problem. 30 I envision, accordingly, a broader reform that would sweep
more widely in providing paid leave for American workers.
II.

THE WORKING FAMILY CAREGIVER AND THE FMLA

Previously configured models of the American family are no longer
the norm. The stereotypical family of 1950 consisted of a married
couple with three children: the father, as the breadwinner, worked
outside the home, and the mother, as caregiver, stayed (worked) at home
with the children. 3 ' Today, less than 15% of American households consist of a married couple with only a male earner. 32 About 60% of all
married couples are composed of dual-earner couples. 33 More than
34
seven million families are now headed by a single parent.
One of the most significant characteristics of the new work/family
structure is that women, the principal caregivers of the 1950 model, have
joined men in working outside the home. 35 The participation of women
28 See Befort, supra note 19, at 410-15, 432-52.
29 See infra Part III.C.
30 See infra Part IV.A-C.
31

BRADLEY

K.

GOOGINS,

WORK/FAMILY

CONFLICTS:

PRIVATE

LIVES-PUBLIC

RE-

3 (1991).
32 Jerry A. Jacobs & Kathleen Gerson, Do Americans Feel Overworked? Comparing

SPONSES

Ideal and Actual Working Time, in WORK & FAMILY: RESEARCH INFORMING POLICY 71, 74

(Toby L. Parcel & Daniel B. Cornfield, eds., 2000).
33 Jerry A. Jacobs & Kathleen Gerson, Toward a Family-Friendly, Gender-Equitable
Work Week, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 457, 459 (1998). The percentage of dual-earner
couples increased from 35.9% of married couples in 1970 to 59.5% in 1997. Id.
34 GOOGINS, supra note 31, at 34. The decrease in marriage rates, increase in divorce,
and growing proportion of births to unwed mothers has created a rise in single-parent homes.
Monica Kirkpatrick Johnson & Jeylan T. Mortimer, Work-Family Orientations and Attainments in the Early Life Course, in WORK & FAMILY: RESEARCH INFORMING POLICY 215, 216
(Toby L. Parcel & Daniel B. Cornfield, eds., 2000); see generally Amy G. Cox & Harriet B.
Presser, NonstandardEmployment Schedules Among American Mothers, in WORK & FAMILY:

RESEARCH INFORMING POLICY 97 (Toby L. Parcel & Daniel B. Cornfield, eds., 2000).
35 See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5)-(6) (recognizing in FMLA preamble that society has traditionally placed the burden of caring for family members on women).
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in the American labor force essentially has doubled since 1950.36 Of

particular significance for work/family relationships is that this increase
cuts across the diversity of family configurations. For example, in 1950,
23% of married women and 46% of single women participated in the
labor force. 37 By 1999, these percentages rose to 61% participation for
married women and 69% participation for unmarried women. 38 The labor force participation of women with children likewise mirrors this
overall trend. In 1950, only 12% of women with children under the age
39
of six worked outside the home, but as of 1999, 64% did so.
Thus, in the new stereotypical arrangement of the twenty-first century, both mom and dad are at work. Yet, with women still bearing the
bulk of family caregiving chores, 40 the competing pressures of work and
family serve to dampen disproportionately the long-term work attach41
ment of female workers.
The federal government's principal attempt at providing some balance to the pressures of work and family was the enactment of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.42 The FMLA entitles eligible
employees to a total of twelve weeks of leave per 12-month period: (a) to
care for a newborn child or a child newly placed with the employee for
adoption or foster care; (b) to care for an employee's child, parent, or
spouse with a serious health condition; or (c) to care for an employee's
own serious health condition. 43 The FMLA requires the employer to
maintain health insurance coverage during the leave period 44 and to return the employee to his or her previous position or to a position with
36

See

HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR STATISTICS: EMPLOYMENT, EARNINGS, PRICES, PRO-

DUCTIVITY, AND OTHER LABOR DATA 43, tbl.1-7 (Eva E. Jacobs ed., 4th ed. 2000) (showing

33.9% of working age females participated in the civilian labor force in 1950 compared to
60.0% in 1999).
37 JODY HEYMANN, THE WIDENING GAP: WHY AMERICA'S WORKING FAMILIES ARE IN

213 fig.A.1 (2000) (reporting data from the
U.S. Census Bureau).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 214 fig.A.2; see also SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT, A LESSER LIFE: THE MYTH OF
JEOPARDY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT

WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN AMERICA 112 (1986).

Similarly, 28% of women with school-aged

children worked outside the home in 1950, compared with 79% in 1999. HEYMANN, supra
note 37, at 214 fig.A.2.
40 See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U.
L. REV. 65, 70 (1998) (noting that women perform more home labor and caregiving duties
than men regardless of their employment status outside of the home).
41 See Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women's Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 371, 386-87 (2001).

42 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2654 (2000).
43 Id. § 2612(a)(1). The FMLA applies only to employers with 50 or more employees,
id. § 2611(4)(A)(i), and only to employees who have worked for the employer for at least 12
months and 1,250 hours during the preceding twelve-month period, id. § 261 l(2)(A).
44 Id. § 2614(c)(1).
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equivalent benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment
following the end of the leave period.4 5 Significantly, the FMLA man46
dated leave is unpaid in nature.

In 2001, the Department of Labor released the results of an eighteen-month survey on the use of FMLA leave. 47 This survey demonstrates that even eight years after the passage of the FMLA, only a small
minority of workers take advantage of the FMLA's leave provisions.
During the eighteen-month survey period, 16.5% of the U.S. employee
population took leave time from work. 48 Of those employees covered by
the FMLA, 18.3 % took leave under the Act, representing a total of 1.9%
of all U.S. employees. 49 The length of leave taken by these employees
varied greatly, with the majority of leave time ranging from 0 to 10
days. 50 The survey also showed that leave-takers were more likely to be
51
female, married, and in higher income groups than workers in general.
Although one of the primary objectives of the FMLA is to balance the
needs of work and family, 52 the most common reason that employees
took leave, according to the survey, was not for a care-giving purpose,
53
but to cope with their own serious health condition.
The Department of Labor survey also identified about 3.5 million
people, or 2.4% of all employees, who reported that they needed leave
Id. § 2614(a)(1).
Id. § 2612(c). An employee may elect, or an employer may require, substitution of
"accrued paid vacation leave, personal leave or family leave" when the leave is triggered by
the birth or adoption of a child or the serious health condition of a family member. Id.
§ 2612(d)(2)(A). Accrued paid medical or sick leave may also be substituted when the purpose of the leave is triggered by a family member's or an employee's own serious health
condition. Id. § 2612(d)(2)(B).
47 See David Cantor et al., Balancing the Needs of Families and Employers: Family and
Medical Leave Surveys, available at http://www.dol.gov/asp/fmlaltoc.htm (last visited May
22, 2004).
48 See id. at 2-2 tbl.2.1 (indicating that the total number of employees taking leave during
the 2000 survey period was 23,830,000-a 0.5% increase over a comparable survey period
ending in 1995).
49 See id. at 3-14 tbl.3.5. Of the employees taking leave, 75.2% used leave once during
the reference period, while 14.5% used leave twice, and 10.2% used leave at least three times.
See id. at 2-3 fig.2.1.
50 See id. at 2-4 fig.2.2 (reporting that 54.1% of employees who took leave took 0-10
days; 26.8% took 11-40 days; 9.2% took 41-60 days; and 9.9% of employees took leave
beyond the 12 weeks (60 days) covered by the FMLA).
51 See id. § 2.1.3. The survey noted that females composed 46.8% of employees in the
surveyed population, but 58.1% of all leave-takers. Id. at app. tbl.A2-2.4.
52 See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2000).
53 See Cantor et al., supra note 47, at 2-5 tbl.2.3, 3-16 tbl.3.8 (indicating that 52.4% of
employees who took general leave did so to care for their own health, and 37.8% of employees
who took leave under FMLA did so for their own health reasons). In contrast, 18.5% of
general leave-takers and 24.4% of FMLA leave-takers took leave to care for a newborn, a
newly adopted, or newly placed foster child, and 11.5% of general leave and 13.5% of FMLA
leave was taken to care for an ill child. Id.
45
46
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for a qualifying reason, but were unable to take it.54 The most commonly noted reason for not taking leave was inability to afford it, reported by 77.6% of employees needing leave. 55 The survey revealed that
this group of "leave-needers" were disproportionately single, non-sala56
ried, and with children living at home.
III.

REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION UNDER THE ADA

The Americans with Disabilities Act, enacted by Congress in 1990,
is the most recent federal anti-discrimination statute. 57 The ADA also is
the most notable employment law statute utilizing an accommodation
framework.
A.

A

DIFFERENT TREATMENT MODEL?

The ADA's anti-discrimination formula differs from that of other
federal anti-discrimination statutes. For example, under Title VII, an
employer is prohibited from discriminating "because of [an] individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'5 8 The ADA's anti-discrimination formula is more complicated than that of Title VII and other federal anti-discrimination statutes in two significant respects. First, only
"qualified individual[s] with a disability" are protected under the ADA. 59
Second, in ascertaining whether an employer is acting in a discriminatory
fashion under the ADA, the statute asks whether the employee is quali60
fied for the job "with or without reasonable accommodation."
Most anti-discrimination statutes embrace an equal treatment model
of discrimination. 6' Neither Title VII nor the ADEA generally impose
any affirmative obligation on employers to assist employees in satisfac54 See id. at 2-14 tbl.2.14.
55 See id. at 2-16 tbl.2.17. In addition, 42.6 % of these workers decided not to take leave
because they thought that doing so might hurt their chances at job advancement. Id.
56 See id. § 2.2.3.
57 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (2000).
58 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) uses similar language in banning discrimination because of age. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(1) (2000) ("It shall be unlawful for an employer to ... discriminate against any
individual . . . because of such individual's age.").
59 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In contrast, "Title VII does not impose any class membership standing requirement." Anyone, regardless of race, gender, or religion, can assert a claim
of discrimination under that statute. See Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The
ADA in Turmoil: Judicial Dissonance, the Supreme Court's Response, and the Future of Disability Discrimination Law, 78 OR. L. REV. 27, 69 (1999).
60 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining "qualified individual with a disability"); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a).
61 For a discussion of the equal treatment model of anti-discrimination statutes, see generally Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of FairEmployment Laws, 38 U. Cri. L. REV. 235, 237 (1971)
(describing the "norm of color blindness" of the laws arising out of the Civil Rights Act); Paul
Steven Miller, Disability Civil Rights and a New Paradigmfor the Twenty-First Century: The
Expansion of Civil Rights Beyond Race, Gender, andAge, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 511, 515
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torily performing the essential functions of the job. 62 These statutes, instead, merely invoke a negative prohibition against employer actions that
discriminate on the basis of certain specified traits.
The ADA arguably goes beyond the equal treatment model to require different treatment in terms of requiring employers to provide reasonable accommodations to otherwise qualified individuals with a
disability. 63 Under this different treatment model, an employer who
merely refrains from treating disabled employees differently than nondisabled employees may be engaging in prohibited discrimination. 64 As
one article has noted, this concept of reasonable accommodation recognizes that "in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them
differently. ' '65 This affirmative accommodation duty, as Professor
Arnow-Richman notes, carries the potential for a powerful restructuring
66
of employment norms and relationships.
B.

SUBSTANTIVE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE

ADA

MODEL

Many commentators feel that the unique ADA framework has not
lived up to its potential as a vehicle for fostering the rights of the disabled. 67 The most conspicuous limitation on the reach of the ADA has
resulted from a series of decisions in which the Supreme Court has nar(1998) (describing the traditional civil rights paradigm as one requiring a "level playing field"
for all workers).
62 A limited duty of reasonable accommodation arises under these two statutes only with
respect to religion, which is a protected trait under Title VII. That statute, similar to the ADA,
provides that an employer must "reasonably accommodate" the religious observances and
practices of its employees up to the point of "undue hardship." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). The
reasonable accommodation duty for religious observances, however, is much more limited
than the accommodation duty mandated by the ADA. The Supreme Court has ruled that an
employer need not incur more than a de minimis hardship in providing an accommodation for
religious purposes. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
63 For a discussion of how the ADA adopts a different treatment model of anti-discrimination law, see Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21
BERKELEY J.EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 40-44 (2000) (noting that the "ADA relies on a different
treatment vision of equality"); Miller, supra note 61, at 514, 516-21 (describing the new civil
rights paradigm as one that "recasts the notion of a 'level' playing field into one of an 'accessible' playing field").
64 See Miller, supra note 61, at 514 ("For disabled people who need reasonable accommodations in order to perform the essential functions of their jobs, 'equal' treatment is tantamount to a barrier to employment, not a gateway."); Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans
with DisabilitiesAct: A National Employment Policy for People with Disabilities,46 BUFF. L.
REV. 123, 146 (1998) ("[I]t is impossible to deny that for disability, if for no other characteristic, perfectly equal treatment can constitute discrimination.").
65 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring), quoted in Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DuKE L.J. 1, 10 (1996).
66 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 4, at 347, 358-62.
67 See, e.g., Diller, supra note 63, at 22 (suggesting that the federal courts currently are
engaged in "some kind of judicial backlash against the ADA"); see also Ruth Colker, The
Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99,
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rowed the class of protected "disabled" employees. 68 The judiciary has
also been reluctant to give free rein to the different treatment view of the
ADA's reasonable accommodation mandate, vetoing, in a number of decisions, otherwise plausible accommodations because they appear to go
beyond formal equality principles to resemble affirmative action
69
measures.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc. 70 provides a prime example. The employee, Nancy Cook Houser, started work for the employer as a picker-a warehouse position requiring employees to pick
pharmaceutical products from a shelf to a conveyor belt. 7 1 A work accident resulted in "tennis elbow" injury to her right arm. 72 Despite the
employer's numerous attempts at accommodation, Houser became unable to perform the essential functions of the picker position.7 3 Houser
then applied for several office jobs within the company, but in each case,
74
the employer selected another employee to transfer into the position.
In affirming a grant of summary judgment for the employer, the
Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the EEOC's view that a disabled employee should be afforded priority in filling vacant positions. 75 The
court, in a decision authored by Judge Posner, criticized the EEOC's position as giving "bonus points" to individuals with disabilities even
where an employee's disability puts her at no disadvantage in bidding for
an open position. 76 Such a result, according to Judge Posner, would constitute "affirmative action with a vengeance. '77 The court instead concluded that "the ADA does not require an employer to reassign a
109 (1999) (finding, based on empirical analysis of court decisions, that defendant employers
prevail in 92.7% of all ADA cases).
68 See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); Albertson's, Inc.
v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516
(1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
69 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 4, at 363-73 (discussing cases under the ADA and
FMLA in which courts have restricted the affirmative nature of statutory accommodation

mandates).
70 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000). Judicial concerns about the preferential nature of ADA
reasonable accommodations most commonly arise with respect to requests by disabled employees for reassignment to other positions. See Stephen F. Befort & Tracey Holmes
Donesky, Reassignment Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or Both?, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1045, 1056-59 (2000).
71 Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1026.
72 Id.
73 id.

74 id. at 1026-27.

75 Id. at 1027 (rejecting EEOC contention that, when reassigning as accommodation, the
"disabled person [is required to] be advanced over a more qualified nondisabled person, provided only that the disabled person is at least minimally qualified to do the job").
76 Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d at 1027.
77 Id. at 1029.
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disabled employee to a job for which there is a better applicant, provided
policy to hire the best applicant
it's the employer's consistent and honest
78
question."
in
job
for the particular
Although the Tenth Circuit reached a different conclusion in a similar reassignment context, 79 other courts have echoed the anti-affirmative
action rhetoric of the Humiston-Keeling, Inc. decision. The Fifth Circuit
in Daugherty v. City of El Paso8° aptly summarized the anti-preference
viewpoint as follows:
[W]e do not read the ADA as requiring affirmative action in favor of individuals with disabilities, in the sense
of requiring that disabled persons be given priority in
hiring or reassignment over those who are not disabled.
It prohibits employment discrimination against qualified
81
individuals with disabilities, no more and no less.
The Supreme Court has recently grappled with the matter of reas82
signment and preferences in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett. In that case,
an employee sought a transfer to a vacant position, but his employer, US
Airways, denied the request on the grounds that such a reassignment
83
would violate its long-standing seniority policy. Under this unilaterally
established policy, employees with greater seniority received a preference in bidding to transfer into covered positions for which they were
84
otherwise qualified.
US Airways argued that the ADA requires only the equal treatment
of individuals with disabilities, not preferential treatment, such as an exemption from a disability-neutral workplace rule that applies to all employees. 85 The Barnett majority rejected this argument, stating, "[t]he
simple fact that an accommodation would provide a 'preference'-in the
sense that it would permit the worker with a disability to violate a rule
that others must obey-cannot, in and of itself, automatically show that
the accommodation is not 'reasonable.'- 86 Recognizing that a request
for preferential treatment does not create an "automatic exemption" from
78

Id.

79 See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1169 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that
the ADA may require reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation "so
long as the employee is qualified for the job and it does not impose an undue burden on the
employer").
80 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995).
81 Id. at 700.
82 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
83 Id. at 395.
84 Id.

85 See id. at 397.
86 Id. at 398 (emphasis in original).
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the reasonable accommodation requirement, 87 the Barnett Court nonetheless concluded that reassignment would not be reasonable in the run of
cases in which it would conflict with the rules of a seniority system. 88
Although a disabled employee might be able to overcome this presumption by presenting evidence of special circumstances, 89 the practical bottom line of the Barnett decision is that equal treatment under a seniority
policy will almost always prevail over the preferential reassignment accommodation provided by the ADA. 90
This line of reassignment cases, accordingly, exhibits a judicial reluctance to construe the ADA reasonable accommodation requirement as
embodying a different treatment model of discrimination. By importing
equal treatment notions, these courts have undercut the transformative
potential of the accommodation mandate. To use Professor Arnow-Richman's phrase, these courts have "subverted" the potential of the ADA's
accommodation framework. 9 1
C.

THE INTERACTIVE PROCESS -

IGNITING A PROCEDURAL

REVOLUTION

While the ADA accommodation model may not have produced a
revolution in the substantive law arena, it is far from a bust. Indeed, a
revolution of quite a different sort has occurred in the procedural arena.
The interactive process contemplated by the ADA is a unique procedural
device that has launched untold numbers of successful workplace
accommodations.
While the ADA itself is silent as to the manner by which parties
should identify the availability of a reasonable accommodation, the regulations interpreting the ADA state "it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the [disabled]
individual."'92 The objective of this dialogue is to "identify the precise
limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations." 93
The EEOC's Interpretive Guidance provides more detail as to the
suggested structure of this process. The Guidance states that it should be
87 Id.

88 Id. at 402-03.
89 Id. at 405. The Court described, as an example of such "special circumstances," the
situation in which an employer does not routinely adhere to the terms of an espoused seniority
policy, thereby reducing employee reliance expectations in such a policy. Id.
90 See Stephen F. Befort, Reasonable Accommodation and Reassignment Under the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Answers, Questions, and Suggested Solutions After U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 45 ARIZ. L. REv. 931, 973 (2003).
91 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 4.
92 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2003).
93 Id.
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a "flexible" process that involves the "individual assessment of both the
particular job at issue, and the specific physical or mental limitations of
the particular individual in need of reasonable accommodation. ' 94 The
Guidance goes on to recommend that the parties jointly engage in a fourstep "problem solving approach" in which the employer should:
(1) Analyze the particular job involved and determine
its purpose and essential functions;
(2) Consult with the individual with a disability to ascertain the precise job-related limitations imposed
by the individual's disability and how those limitations could be overcome with a reasonable
accommodation;
(3) In consultation with the individual to be accommodated, identify potential accommodations and assess
the effectiveness each would have in enabling the
individual to perform the essential functions of the
position; and
(4) Consider the preference of the individual to be accommodated and select and implement the accommodation that is most appropriate for both the
95
employee and the employer.
In contrast to the substantive law of accommodation under the
ADA, most courts are favorably disposed toward this procedural component of the reasonable accommodation obligation. Most circuit courts
that have considered the issue have ruled that an employer has an affirmative obligation to engage in the interactive process once it has been put
on notice that an accommodation may be necessary. 96 The courts are
divided with respect to the appropriate consequences for failing to engage in the interactive process. While at least one circuit court decision
has suggested that independent liability may exist under the ADA for a
party who fails to participate in the interactive process, 97 most courts
hold that liability will arise only where an employer has failed to implement a reasonable accommodation that would enable a disabled em94 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (2003).
95 Id.

96 See, e.g., Barnett v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated
by US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (see discussion supra notes 73-80 and
accompanying text); Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 952 (8th Cir. 1999);
Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 312 (3rd Cir. 1999). Some other circuit court
decisions, however, have found that participation in the interactive process is not mandatory.
These courts point out that the statute only mandates the provision of a reasonable accommodation if there is evidence that one exists. See, e.g., Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285
(11th Cir. 1997); White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 363 (10th Cir. 1995).
97 See Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135-36 (7th Cir. 1996).
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ployee to perform adequately in the workplace. 98 Taking a somewhat
different tack, a growing number of circuit courts have ruled that an employer's failure to engage in the interactive process ordinarily should
warrant a trial court's refusal to grant an employer's motion for summary
judgment. 99 Some courts reach this conclusion on the grounds that a
failure to participate in the interactive process constitutes evidence of bad
faith,' 0 0 while others conclude that an employer's failure to consult shifts
the "burden of production concerning the availability of a reasonable accommodation from the employee to the employer."' 0 1
The ADA's interactive process has launched a quiet revolution that
gets little coverage in the case reporter system. All over the United
States, disabled employees and human resources managers are joining
together to invent mutually acceptable workplace solutions in the form of
reasonable accommodations. 10 2 The alternative dispute resolution format of the interactive process facilitates a creative and cooperative search
for win-win outcomes. The prospect of litigation in the absence of a
voluntary resolution provides a powerful incentive for both parties to
conduct this search in good faith. The interactive process, in short, has
significantly transformed procedural structures and norms impacting the
disabled.
D.

A

BETTER MODEL FOR EASING WORK/FAMILY TIME PRESSURES

The scorecard for the ADA accommodation requirement shows
mixed results. While the different treatment notion of accommodation
has not transformed substantive law to the extent that some disability
advocates had hoped, the interactive process has succeeded in transforming the manner in which disability issues are considered and resolved
short of litigation.
Finding this mixed outcome does not mean that I disagree with Professor Arnow-Richman in her suggestion that an accommodation approach is not the best means of addressing the caregiver time crunch
98 See, e.g., Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 2001); Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000).
99 See, e.g., Morton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 272 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 2001)
(citing Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1113-14); Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 952; Taylor, 184 F.3d at 317-18.
100 See Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 952; Taylor, 184 F.3d at 317-18.
10 Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original). See also
Morton, 272 F.3d at 1256.
102 See generally Hope A. Comisky, Guidelinesfor Successfully Engaging in the Interactive Process to Finda ReasonableAccommodation Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct,
13 LAB. LAW. 499 (1998) (advising employers on how to conduct the interactive process for
identifying possible reasonable accommodations under the ADA); Jathan W. Janove, Skating
Through the Minefield, HR MAG., Mar. 2003, at 107; Howard A. Simon & Alison J. Morbey,
The ADA's "Interactive Process" for Determining Reasonable Accommodations: How Much
Interaction Is Enough?, 24 EMPLOYEE. REL. L.J. 5 (1998).
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problem. Her observation that a less defined accommodation approach is
03
As a
more prone to judicial and employer resistance remains accurate.
use
to
than
other
ADA
the
in
choice
little
had
practical matter, Congress
indiof
needs
multi-faceted
the
with
an accommodation approach to deal
viduals with different impairments of varying intensity. But, in the context of addressing employee concerns with respect to the competing
needs of family and work, a more specific statutory approach is both
possible and preferable.
IV.

THE AMERICAN WORKER TIME CRUNCH

The problem of balancing work and non-work time demands is not
limited solely to caregivers. American workers generally are experiencing a significant and growing time crunch problem. This observation is
not meant to denigrate the particularly heavy time demands on working
caregivers nor downplay how these time demands contribute to a work
attachment gap for women workers. It is meant, instead, to suggest that
the American worker time crunch problem is pervasive in nature and that
broad-based reform to assist workers generally, including caregivers,
should be considered.
A.

THE NUMBERS

The number of hours worked by American employees has increased
dramatically in the past few decades.'04 In 1967, the average employee
5
worked 1,716 hours annually. 10 This figure rose to 1,878 by 2000, rep10 6 Similarly,
resenting an addition of 162 more hours of work per year.
American employees in 2000 worked an average of 47.0 weeks per year,
up from 43.5 in 1967.107
These increases are compounded for dual-income families in which
both parents work. The average married-couple family worked almost
103 See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
104 See Barry Bluestone & Stephen Rose, The Macroeconomics of Work Time, 56 REV.
Soc. EcON. 425 (1998); SCHOR, supra note 3, at 30 tbl.2.2 (noting that the number of hours

worked per week increased from 39.8 in 1969 to 40.7 in 1987 and that the number of weeks
worked per year has increased from 43.9 in 1969 to 47.1 in 1987). While some researchers
dispute the findings that workers are increasing their hours, most of these studies show only

hours.
that average weekly hours are not increasing but do not look to the increases in annual
See Bluestone & Rose, supra, at 427; Jacobs & Gerson, supra note 32, at 74.
105 See MISHEL ET AL., supra note 2, at 117 tbl.2.1.
106 Id.
107 Id. Not only are employees on the job for more hours annually, but there also has
been an increase in the proportion of employees working long hours. See Jacobs & Gerson,

supra note 32, at 74 (noting an increase in the number of employees working in excess of 50
hours per week).
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twelve more weeks per year in 2000 than in 1969.108 In 1979, these
families worked an average of 3,331 hours per year-a figure that increased to 3,719 hours by 2000, representing an increase of 388 hours. 10 9

These increases are particularly pronounced for middle-income families,
who have added 660 hours, or 16 weeks of full-time work, since 1979.11
Comparatively, the United States leads the industrialized world in
hours worked."1 ' While that honor once belonged to Japan, American
employees now on average work almost two weeks more per year than
their Japanese counterparts. 1 2 The numbers are even more dramatic
when the comparison turns to European countries. As of 2002, for example, the average American employee worked approximately 400 more
hours per year than did workers in Germany and France. 1 3
Much of this divergence flows from the fact that Americans have
access to less vacation and leave time than do workers in other countries.
Nearly all Western European countries statutorily mandate minimum annual vacation periods of four to six weeks. 1 4 In contrast, the average
American worker in private industry has only two weeks of paid vacation
per year.'
Similarly, the parental leave provisions adopted by most
other industrialized nations tend to guarantee longer periods of leave than
108 MISHEL ET AL., supra note 2, at 99 tbl.1.26 (noting rise from 80.4 weeks worked per
year in 1969 to 92.3 weeks worked per year in 2000; the weeks are aggregated for each parent
in the household, so with 52 weeks per year, a two-parent family can work up to 104 weeks
per year, id. at 98).
109 Id. at 100 tbl.l.27.
1O Id. at 99.
111 See Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, American Employees Surpass Japanese,Lead Industrialized World in Hours Worked, 17 BNA HUM. RESOURCES REP. 1147 (Oct. 25, 1999); Rena I.
Steinzor, The Corruptionof Civic Environmentalism,30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10909, 10920 (2000)
(citing The Future of Work, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2000, at 92).
112 See Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, supra note 111, at 1147.
113 See University of Groningen Growth and Development Centre and The Conference
Board, Total Economy Database: Hours (February 2004), at http://www.eco.rug.nlggdc/
dseries/hours.shtml (last visited May 22, 2004) (reporting the annual hours worked per person
employed in 2002 to be 1,873 in the United States, 1,444 in Germany, and 1,486 in France).
While individual working time is on the rise for American employees, many European countries are exploring initiatives to reduce working hours. See, e.g., Annik De Rong6 & Michel
Molitor, The Reduction of Working Hours in Belgium: Stakes and Confrontations, in WORKING TIME IN TRANSITON: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WORKING HOURS IN INDUSTRIAL NATIONS 149 (Hinrichs et al. eds., 1991) (documenting union pressure to reduce workweek
hours); Stephen E. Tallent, France, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS 3-1, 39 (William L. Keller ed., Supp. 2002) (discussing the adoption of legislation in France in 1998
reducing the work week from 39 to 35 hours).
114 See Bookspan, supra note 3, at 73.
115 See SHEILA B. KAMERMAN & ALFRED J. KAHN, THE RESPONSIVE WORKPLACE: EMPLOYERS AND A CHANGING LABOR FORCE 58 (1987). See also ELLEN GALINSKY ET AL., FEEL-

OVERWORKED: WHEN WORK BECOMES Too MUCH 30 (2001) (reporting the results of a
survey in which 26% of U.S. employees agreed that they do not take all of the vacation they
are entitled to because of job demands).
ING
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does the FMLA, 116 while also providing employees with some7 type of
financial compensation during their respective leave periods."
B.

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE WORKER TIME CRUNCH

1.

Employee FinancialNeed

Since the 1970's, the real hourly wages earned by American employees have fallen, particularly for low-wage, nonwhite-collar workers. 1 8 Many employees, accordingly, are working more hours in order
9
to maintain household income levels. 1 Production and non-supervisory
workers, for example, "must now work six more weeks annually to
maintain the same standard of living as comparable workers had in
1973."12o Similarly, many families must have two individuals working

12 1
Over the past thirty years,
in order to support an adequate lifestyle.
contributions to family income by previously non-working spouses have
increased significantly. 12 2 During the 1980's, for example, families in
real losses if not
the lower 60% of total income would have experienced
3
12
for the contributions of these working spouses.

2.

Employer FinancialIncentives

Employers also have financial incentives to squeeze more working
time out of their employees. One such incentive prompts employers to
require salaried employees to work longer hours. Salaried employees
receive a set amount of compensation regardless of the number of hours
worked and are exempt from the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA).12 4 Thus, employers do not incur increased costs
116 See Nancy E. Dowd, Family Values and Valuing Family: A Blueprint for Family
Leave, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335, 341 (1993) (noting that the minimum length of parental
leave mandated in other industrialized nations generally ranges from five to eighteen months).
117 See Lisa J. Gitnik, Note, Will the Interactionof the Family and Medical Leave Act and
the Americans with DisabilitiesAct Leave Employees with an "Undue Hardship?", 74 WASH.
U. L.Q. 283, 311 n.151 (1996).
118 See PETER CAPPELLI ET AL., CHANGE AT WORK 181-84 (1997); MISHEL ET AL., supra
note 2, at 93-94; Sanford M. Jacoby, Melting into Air? Downsizing, Job Stability, and the
Future of Work, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV.1195, 1233-34 (2000).
119 See Paul C. Weiler, A Principled Reshaping of Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 183 (2001) ( "Median real family incomes went up more
than 100% from 1947 to 1973, but since 1973 they have risen by only 10%.").
120 Steinzor, supra note 111, at 10920.
121 See Bluestone & Rose, supra note 104, at 426; MISHEL ET AL., supra note 2, at 97-98.
122 See MISHEL ET AL., supra note 2, at 103 fig.IS (noting that the percentage of wives

earnings to family income has risen to approximately 34% in 2000, up from 25% in 1974).
123 Id. at 104.
124 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201-219 (2000). The FLSA exempts
executive, administrative, and professional employees who are paid on a salary basis from the
Act's minimum wage and overtime pay requirements. Id. § 213(a)(1); 29 C.F.R.
§ 541.1-541.3 (2003).
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by requiring salaried employees to work additional hours. 125 The number of employees working in exempt, salaried positions has virtually
doubled since the FLSA was enacted in 1938.126

Similarly, the increasing cost of employee benefits encourages employers to require longer work weeks. 127 The growth in such benefits
has far outpaced that of wages in the past five decades. In 1948, employer-paid benefits accounted for only 5.1% of employee compensation,
but by 2000, such benefits constituted 15.4% of compensation. 1 28 The
costs of these fringe benefits are usually fixed for a full-time employee
without regard to how many hours the employee actually works. 129
Thus, the hourly cost of employee benefits declines as the employee puts
in more hours. 130 Since benefits are costly and constitute an increasing
proportion of employee compensation, employers have an economic incentive to meet labor needs by increasing the number of hours rather than
by increasing the number of employees.
C.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE WORKER TIME CRUNCH

As employees spend more time at work and fewer families operate
under the breadwinner/homemaker model, workers increasingly are
caught in a serious time crunch. Work and family obligations are competing for a shrinking amount of free time-a trend particularly accentuated in single-parent and dual-earner families. On a daily basis workers
must choose between work and family and attempt to negotiate solutions
to these conflicting obligations. Recent surveys conducted by the Families and Work Institute reported that 60% of American workers sometimes felt overwhelmed by work' 3' and that 63% of American workers
would prefer to work fewer hours. 132
The worker time crunch has several negative implications for American society. First, as employees spend more time at work, they spend
less time caring for and interacting with other family members. 133 In
125 Jacobs & Gerson, supra note 32, at 75.
126 Jacobs & Gerson, supra note 33, at 461 (noting that 14.8% of workers were exempt
managers or professionals in 1938, while that figure had risen to 28.3% by 1995).
127 See id.
128 MISHEL ET AL., supra note 2, at 120 tbl.2.2.
129 See Jacobs & Gerson, supra note 32, at 75; Belinda M. Smith, Time Norms in the
Workplace: Their Exclusionary Effect and Potentialfor Change, II COLUM. J. GENDER & L.

271, 284 (2002).
130 See Jacobs & Gerson, supra note 32, at 75; Smith, supra note 129, at 284.
131 GALINSKY ET AL., supra note 115, at 14.
132 JAMES T. BOND ET AL., THE 1997 NATIONAL STUDY OF THE CHANGING WORKFORCE

74-75 fig.5.2 (1998).
133 See SYLVIA ANN

HEWLETT, WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS: THE COST OF NEGLECTING

26 (1991) ("While the proportion of adult life spent living with spouse and
children stood at 62% in 1960, it is now 43%-the lowest in our history.").
OUR CHILDREN
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particular, the amount of parental time spent interacting with children has
declined dramatically over the past 30 years,' 34 with negative impacts on
both emotional' 35 and intellectual 36 development. Children increasingly
spend long hours in day-care facilities 37 that are expensive 38 and hard
to find. 139 Similar issues arise with respect to extended family members.1 40 Today, one out of four U.S. families is responsible for the care
of an elderly relative, and this number is rising. 141
On the other side of the coin, family obligations also interfere with
workplace productivity. With so many care-givers now participating in
the labor force, family emergencies readily become workplace disruptions. In a recent study, Jody Heymann interviewed employees to ascertain how family obligations impacted work time and found that during
the one-week interview period, 30% of the interviewed employees reduced work hours during at least one work day to meet the needs of
family members, 12% needed to cut back on two or more days, and 5%
42
needed to cut back on three or more days.'
Today's employees, after meeting commitments to family and work,
have little time remaining for anything else. The worker time crunch
134 See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 111 (1988) (finding that between 1960 and 1986, parental time available to children fell ten hours per week in
white households and 12 hours per week in black households); The Future of Work, supra note
11l, at 92 (asserting that "[t]he average mother and father spends [sic] 22 hours less every
week with their children than parents did in 1969").
135 See Toby L. Parcel et al., The Effects of ParentalWork and Maternal Nonemployment
on Children's Reading and Math Achievement, in WORK & FAMILY: RESEARCH INFORMING
POLICY 189, 191-92 (Toby L. Parcel & Daniel B. Cornfield eds., 2000).
136 See id. at 194 ( "[B]oth mother's and father's overtime hours negatively affected
young children's verbal facility. Parents who work overtime hours may not spend as much
time interacting or playing with their children as do parents who work 35 to 40 hours per
week.").
137 See generally Bookspan, supra note 3, at 46; GOOGINS, supra note 31, at 200-01.
138 See Cox & Presser, supra note 34, at 97. The financial burden is particularly difficult
for single-parent families, as they generally have less money for child-care and less flexibility
in their employment than many married employees. Id. at 97-98.
139 See Bookspan, supra note 3, at 46 (reporting that "forty-four states claim that the
demand for child care [in their state] exceeds its availability."). See also Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Pilot Survey on the Incidence of Child Care Resource and Referral Services in June
2000, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS REP. 946, at I (November 2000) (reporting that, as of
June 2000, only 13.8% of all civilian employees had access to child-care resources and referral
services).
140 See Susan Christopherson, Trading Time for Consumption: The Failure of WorkingHours Reduction in the United States, in WORKING TIME IN TRANSITION: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF WORKING HOURS IN INDUSTRIAL NATIONS

171, 181 (Karl Hinrichs et al. eds.,

1991).
141 HEYMANN, supra note 37, at 2; see H.R. REP. No. 103-8 (1993) (noting the demographic shift of an increasing aging population and the National Council on Aging's estimate
that 20% to 25% of American workers have some caregiving responsibility for an older
relative).
142 See HEYMANN, supra note 37, at 24.
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translates into less leisure time 43 and lower participation rates in community clubs and activities.144 Americans are even sleeping less and do
not always get the amount of sleep optimal for health.145
Finally, the time crunch has increased the stress of American workers both on and off the job.' 46 Many workers feel overworked and unhappy.' 4 7 And, overworked employees report less successful
48
relationships with spouses, family, and friends."
D.

A

PROPOSED SOLUTION

American workers need the option of more time away from work
and sufficient pay to make that non-work time practically accessible.
Since an accommodation approach is likely to encounter significant resistance from both judicial and management sources, 149 legislation in the
form of a defined substantive benefit is the most logical vehicle to accomplish this task.
The outline of such a legislative proposal is set out below. In a
nutshell, this proposal would amend the Family and Medical Leave Act
to provide that:
(1) Covered employers must pernmit covered employees
to take paid personal leave for two of the Act's
twelve-week period of protected leave.
(2) Upon a minimum of seven days advance notice, an
employee may take all or part of the period of paid
personal leave without restriction as to the reason or
use of such personal leave time.
(3) Pay for such leave should be provided in a manner
and an amount similar to that provided for unemployment insurance purposes. That is, the pay
should be provided from a government fund, payable at one-half of the employee's average weekly
143 See generally Laura Pappano, Running Out of Time: Are You Working More and Playing Less Than You Used to? Or Does It Just Feel That Way?, BOSTON GLOBE, June 25, 2000,

at 12.
144 See Jerry A. Jacobs & Kathleen Gerson, Who Are the Overworked Americans?, 56
REV. Soc. ECON. 442, 456 (1998) (noting that working 50 to 60 hours a week limits participation in civil society).
145 See SCHOR, supra note 3, at 11 (citing studies that a majority of Americans are getting
60 to 90 minutes less sleep a night than they should for optimal health and performance).
146 See Pappano, supra note 143, at 12; SCHOR, supra note 3, at 11.
147 See GALINSKY ET AL., supra note 115, at 49-54; Jacobs & Gerson, supra note 144, at
450-55.
148 See GALINSKY ET AL., supra note 115, at 51-52; see also SCHOR, supra note 3, at 12

(indicating that many two-earner couples report less happiness and satisfaction resulting from

the lack of available family time).
149 See supra notes 15-21, 67-91 and accompanying text.
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wage, subject to a maximum equal to two-thirds of
the applicable state-wide average weekly wage rate.
(4) The government fund would be financed by
equivalent one-third contributions from employees,
employers, and general revenue. The employer's
contribution would be a percentage payroll tax,
rather than an experience-rated contribution. The
employee's contribution also would be a percentage
payroll tax similar to social security.
(5) Employers could opt out of the personal leave mandate by providing a minimum of four weeks of leave
per year that may be taken by employees for care,
sickness, or personal leave/vacation purposes. Employers that provide a minimum of three weeks of
leave per year for such purposes would be obligated
to provide and contribute towards only one week of
paid personal leave time.
This proposal offers a number of advantages. The proposal provides a modest amount of compensation that will make leave for caregiving and other purposes more accessible.' 50 It provides a flexible format
for leave-taking that requires little government oversight, yet provides
employers with advance notice for planning purposes. The proposal
builds upon the existing FMLA framework, adopting both its coverage
formula and its current twelve-week leave period. Employers are provided with a self-help mechanism to avoid administrative compliance
difficulties. By addressing the American worker time crunch problem on
a systemic basis, the proposal does not suffer from criticism that it would
marginalize female caregivers. Finally, the proposal should not harm the
competitive posture of American employers since the resulting period of
paid leave or vacation is still less than international norms. Although
American employers highly value flexibility in today's global economy, 15 1 America's competitive edge should not depend upon sub-stan52
dard labor practices.1

150 See Angie K. Young, Assessing the Family and Medical Leave Act in Terms of Gender
Equality, Work/Family Balance, and the Needs of Children, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 113, 154
(1998) (urging a wage replacement component of the FMLA to "further both gender equality
and the right of every worker to participate in both work and family").
151 See Katherine V. W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 539-49 (2001).
152 See Befort, supra note 19, at 422-24, 460.
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CONCLUSION
This article addresses issues of accommodation and time. On the
former issue, I concur with Professor Arnow-Richman's observation that
an accommodation approach to employment law reform is prone to resistance from the courts. Experience under the ADA illustrates a judicial
reluctance to go beyond a traditional equal treatment view of discrimination to embrace a more affirmative different treatment model of discrimination. But this does not mean that the ADA's reasonable
accommodation framework has been a failure. To the contrary, while the
reasonable accommodation requirement may have fallen somewhat short
of expectations on the substantive law front, it has launched a procedural
revolution in fostering an interactive process by which employers and
employees cooperatively work to identify suitable workplace accommodations. The impact of this procedural device is not as readily noticeable
as the courts' substantive law limitations, but it may serve as the ADA's
most significant contribution to this point.
Which brings us to the issue of time. American workers, quite simply, do not have enough time to tend to caregiving and other non-work
needs. While this is a particularly acute problem for caregivers, the
American worker time crunch is a problem of pandemic proportions.
American workers of all stripes are required or pressured to spend everincreasing amounts of time at work. The ADA model represents one
possible format for accommodating non-work time demands. The first
decade of experience under the ADA suggests that judicial and employer
resistance would temper the substantive law advances of such an approach without necessarily conferring the procedural advantages of the
ADA's interactive process. I agree with Professor Arnow-Richman that
a more specific legislative approach is preferable as a vehicle for reducing the working caregiver time problem. However, I would aim more
broadly. The pervasive nature of the American worker time crunch problem deserves a broader legislative solution. This article suggests one
possible approach. Hopefully, this article will contribute to the ongoing
debate about how American workers can obtain more time away from
work.

